We propose two improvements to the Fiat Shamir authentication and signature scheme. We reduce the communication of the Fiat Shamir authentication scheme to a single round while preserving the e ciency of the scheme. This also reduces the length of Fiat Shamir signatures. Using secret keys consisting of small integers we reduce the time for signature generation by a factor 3 to 4. We propose a variation of our scheme using class groups that may be secure even if factoring large integers becomes easy.
Introduction and Summary
The Fiat{Shamir signature scheme (1986) and the GQ{scheme by Guillou and Quisquater (1988) are designed to reduce the number of modular multiplications that are necessary for generating signatures in the RSA{scheme. Using multicomponent private and public keys Fiat and Shamir generate signatures much faster than with the RSA{scheme. The drawback is that signatures are rather long. They are about t{times longer than RSA{signatures, where t is the round number in the Fiat{Shamir scheme. Using single component keys Guillou and Quisquater obtain signatures of about the same length as in the RSA{scheme but the cost for signature generation is only slightly reduced (by a factor of about 3) compared to the RSA{scheme.
In this paper we propose a new signature scheme and a corresponding authentication scheme that reduces the length of signatures in the Fiat{Shamir scheme to about the length of RSA{signatures. Signature generation with the new scheme is about 3 to 4 times faster than with the Fiat{Shamir scheme. The e ciency of the new signature scheme is comparable to that of the discrete logarithm signature scheme by Schnorr (1989) : In the new scheme signature generation is somewhat slower, signature veri cation about 5 times faster than in the discrete logarithm scheme. Signatures, private and public keys are longer in the new scheme.
We present the basic version of the new signature scheme in section 2. This basic version preserves the e ciency of the Fiat{Shamir scheme but reduces the length of signatures. In section 3 we present a variant of the new scheme that generates signatures about 3 to 4 times faster than with the Fiat{Shamir scheme. The authentication scheme that corresponds to the signature scheme is presented in section 4. It is shown to be secure unless computing non trivial 2 t -th roots modulo N is easy. A variation of our scheme using class groups is given in section 5. This variant may be secure even if factoring large integers is easy. Step 3 requires at most kt + t ? 1 modular multiplications; for random e only t(k + 2)=2 ? 1 modular multiplications are required on the average.
Step 1 requires t squarings and can be done in a preprocessing stage that is independent of the message m.
Signature veri cation.
input signature (e; y), message m, v = (v 1 ; . . .; v k ); I; S; N.
1. check the signature S for (I; v).
e ij 2 i?1 j (mod N) 3. check that e = h(z; m) .
Signature veri cation can be done using at most kt+t modular multiplications. For random e only t(k + 2)=2 + 1 modular multiplications are required on the average.
Step 2 
Fast Signatures
The generation of signatures can be accelerated by choosing secret keys s consisting of small integers s 1 ; . . . ; s k . The security of this variation of the scheme is based on the assumption that computing 2 t {roots modulo N is di cult. No particular algorithms are known to compute 2 t {roots modulo N given that these 2 t {roots are of order N 2 ?t+1 . This can be done using about 2 32 steps.
For the e ciency of the scheme we suppose that P j e i;j 8 for i = 1; . . . ; t. Then we have Q e i;j =1 s j < 2 512 for all i and computing this product does not require any modular reduction. Consequently step 3 of the procedure for signature generation requires only 2t ? 1 full modular multiplications; the other multiplications are with small numbers. Thus step 3 costs an equivalent of about 2:5t ? 1 full modular multiplications.
Step 1 of the procedure for signature generation requires t additional modular multiplications, but these multiplications are done in preprocessing mode independent of the message that is to be signed. The total cost of about 2:5t ? 1 modular multiplications for signature generation compares favourable with the average of (k=2 + 1)t modular multiplications in the original Fiat{Shamir scheme.
The authentication protocol.
(Prover A proves its identity to veri er B) The probability of success for this attack is 2 ?tk .
We prove in the following theorem that this success rate cannot be increased unless we can easily compute some nontrivial 2 t {th root modulo N. For this let e A be an interactive, probabilistic Turing machine that is given the xed values k; t; N. Let RA be the internal random bit string of e A. Let . At least half of the 1{ entries are in heavy rows since the number of 1{entries in non{heavy rows is at most SÃ ;v #rows #columns=2. Thus the row RA that succeeds in step 1 is heavy with probability at least 1/2. A heavy row has at least two 1{entries.
We abbreviate " = SÃ ;v . The probability that step 1 probes i" ?1 random RA for some i 2 IN without nding an 1{entry is at most (1 ? ") i=" < 2:7 ?i . Thus the average number of probes for the loop of step 1 is 1 X i=1 i" ?1 2:7 ?i+1 = O(" ?1 ):
We have with probability at least 1/2 that u " ?1 =2. The row RA is heavy with probability at least 1/2. If these two cases happen then step 2 nds a successful e with probability 1?(1?"=2) 2=" > 1?2:7 ?1 , and we have e 6 = e with probability 1=2. Thus AL terminates after one iteration of steps 1 and 2 with probability 1 4 (1 ? 2:7 ?1 ) 1 2 > 0:07: The probability that AL performs exactly i iterations is at most 0:93 i?1 . Alltogether we see that the average number of probes for AL is at most This proves the claim.
QED 5 A variation of the new scheme using class groups
One can obviously modify the new scheme so that the private and public key components s i ; v i are elements of an arbitrary nite abelian group G, i.e. we can replace the group ZZ N of invertible elements in ZZ N by the group G. The e ciency of signature generation and signature veri cation relies on the e ciency of the multiplication in G. For the generation of the public key components v i = s ?2 t i we need an e cient division algorithm in G. The security of the authentication and the signature scheme requires that computing 2 t {th roots in G is di cult.
A particular type of suitable groups are class groups C 4 of equivalence classes of binary quadratic forms aX 2 + bXY + CY 2 2 ZZ X; Y ] with negative discriminant 4 = b 2 ? 4ac. The multiplication in C 4 , which is called composition, is only slightly slower than modular multiplication for integers of the order of 4. All known algorithms for computing 2 t {th roots in C 4 require knowledge of the group order h 4 of C 4 which is called the class number.
Class groups C 4 have the following advantage over the group ZZ N :
The problem of computing class numbers h 4 is harder than the problem of factoring integers N of the order N j 4 j. Computing the class number h 4 is hard no matter whether 4 is prime or composite.
No trusted authority is required for the generation of 4, since there is no hidden secret, as is the factorization of the modulus N in the Fiat{Shamir scheme.
For the sake of completeness we give all the details for the operation in class groups. 
